JUDICIAL COMPLAINT
CANON 3: A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE FAIRLY, IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY The duties of judicial office take precedence over all other activities. In performing the duties prescribed by law, the judge should adhere to the following standards:
A.
Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
The Circuit Judges, William J. Bauer, Richard A. Posner and John L. Coffey were neither faithful to nor maintained professional competence in law in their Order of March 19, 1984 entered in Case No. 82-2627 UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. J. PATRICK DOHM, Defendant-Appellant in pertinent parts, to-wit:
On page 4, 2. The Indictment
The Circuit Judges attempt to paper over the gaping hole in the indictment, that is, the lack of the word knowingly (as mandated by US Attorneys Manual, Chapter 9, Section 1322) or other word or words of similar import by stating “This omission in the statute is clearly deliberative in view of the fact that interstate transportation ‘with unlawful or fraudulent intent’ is an element of the offenses defined in other paragraphs of Sec. 2314, cannot be further from the truth. The simple fact that the indictment clearly lacks the word of criminal intent, knowingly, as mandated by the US Attorneys Manual, Chapter 9, Section 1322, or other word or words of similar import, is patently not a matter for deliberation or debate and speaks directly to the Circuit Judges’ unfaithfulness and professional incompetence in law. It is impermissible to ‘borrow’ an essential element from one of
those crimes or any other crime in an attempt to revive the otherwise fatally defective indictment of another. And even if it were permissible to ‘borrow’ that word or words from any other section, they would have had to have been positively included in the indictment in question but was not.
The Circuit Judges’ assertion, citing United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1883), that “the indictment is to be read as a whole” belies the fact that the indictment in question consists of one sentence only and therefore unlike Watkins, with multiple different counts and sentences, cannot be read as a whole there being nothing else to read except the indictment itself.
The Circuit Judges’ statement, “Each count here clearly stated that Dohm was charged with knowingly obtaining by fraud Mortgage Associates drafts drawn on a Rhode Islands bank”,
is an egregiously false statement on its face and again speaks directly to the professional incompetence and unfaithfulness in law of the Circuit Judges. Nowhere in the indictment in question is this statement shown to have any credence or plausibility.
Additionally, their positive statement that “the indictment in effect charges Dohm with a knowing interstate transportation” is hollow, per se, for the fact that knowledge of a crime is not a crime; the indictment charges the appellant with the act of transporting and not having knowledge of a transportation. Besides, the Circuit Judges dismissed out of hand the Supreme Court rulings of United States v. Hess, 124 US 483, (1888) 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516 and United States v Carll, 105 US 611 (1881) the latter court ruling succinctly:
“In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty
or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished; and the fact that the statute in question, read in the light of the common law, and of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court to infer the intent of the legislature, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent” (emphasis mine), illuminating, once again, the Circuit Judges unfaithfulness and professional incompetence in law.
The Judgments of Conviction entered in the instant case after trial, one of “knowingly, willfully and unlawfully for transportation of securities obtained by fraud” and one of “knowingly, willfully and with unlawful and fraudulent intent, transporting falsely made and forged securities in interstate commerce” bear little or no resemblance to the contents of the indictment in question, bearing once again on the professional incompetence and unfaithfulness in law of the Circuit Judges.
In Stirone v. United States, 361 US 212, 216 (80 S.Ct. 270, 4
L.Ed.2d 252) the court said “Ever since Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849, was decided in 1887, it has been
the rule that after an indictment has been returned its charges
may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand
jury itself. In holding that this could not be done, Mr. Justice
Miller, speaking for the Court, said:
'If it lies within the province of a court to change the charging
part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to
have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it
if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great
importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by
a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner's trial for a crime,
and without which the constitution says 'no person shall be held
to answer,' may be frittered away until its value is almost
destroyed.'121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786.
“It is axiomatic in our legal system that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against him”. STIRONE v. UNITED STATES, 361 US 212, 217, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed. 2d 252 (1960)
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
J. Patrick Dohm Rockford Illinois
6532 Spring Brook Road #303
Rockford, IL 61114
(815) 282-3184
